It's a good review in light of what seems to becoming an aimless American involvement in Afghanistan right now.
The article hits on many themes, a couple that seem important to me are the difference between the performance of highly trained, highly motivated troops, and regulars, and also the effect of feckless governmental leadership on the effort to win a war.
As we say, read the whole thing. The French struggle to hold on to their colony was by no means a hopeless cause. They controlled most of the country and population, and when they could set things up correctly, they could deliver devastating defeats to the Vietminh (precursors to the North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong guerrillas encountered by Americans). Their Foreign Legion and Paratroop divisions could aggressively outfight the Vietminh if employed properly.
The battle of Dien Bien Phu was supposedly that setup, but, due largely to lackadaisical prosecution of the battle by senior French leadership, the battle turned into a loss for the French, even though it was a Pyrrhic victory for the Vietminh, a la the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War (which really was a Pyrrhic loss for the Viet Cong, not a Pyrrhic victory). Perception often matters more than facts.
Besides education and admiration of the heroics on both sides in that war, the point of me bringing this up is that it is the attitude of the country's populations and leadership that prosecutes the war that has as much to do with victory as the efforts of the local commanders and troops. We went into Afghanistan and Iraq with focussed purposes and succeeded spectacularly in attaining our goals in both cases. However, we then lost focus to what our purpose was and our efforts in those countries became less effective. It took George Bush's willpower and General Petraeus' Surge strategy to refocus American efforts and secure the situation we desired in Iraq, and to finally attain all of our goals.
We now have a feckless leader, supposedly focussed on Afghanistan, but actually having no desire and no clue how to prosecute that war, and a population that is now seriously questioning our involvement. Our troops perform well regardless, but that alone will not secure victory.
I'll just give one large quote near the end:
So ended the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. History has ruled the French defeat inevitable, which demeans the sacrifices made by the soldiers on each side. The Viets won thanks to the unstinting efforts of their army. And even so, the decision hung in the balance. With better command and support, the base could have held out and possibly set the ground for a sensible peace like that allowed by Britain’s victory in the 1950s Malayan Emergency. The war, moreover, needn’t have ended because Dien Bien Phu was overrun. The severe losses forced upon the Viet-Minh made their victory pyrrhic. The Viet-Minh were in no position during the height of the monsoon to move their shattered units to threaten Hanoi. Just as conditions on the ground had not changed much after de Lattre’s 1951 victories, so they hadn’t in summer 1954. What had changed was France’s willingness to continue the fight—politics, not combat, decided the war. Ho’s strategy had proved far more adept than Giap’s tactics.The article itself does address Afghanistan and also goes on to discuss the ferocity of the French paratroopers efforts in the Battle of Algiers. Do read!